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The publication of Japan's Emergence as a Modern State in 1940 by Canadian scholar-
turned-diplomat E. Herbert Norman put into operation the category of "modernity" for North 
American history-writing about Japan. After 1940, uses of "modernity" existed in tension with 
relative disuses of the category, and the category itself changed definition. These fluctuations can 
be attributed primarily to political circumstances and the political choices made by historians. 
In using the expression "political circumstances," I have in mind primarily international 
politics, especially Japan-U.S. relations, but domestic politics and politics within the academy 
also belong to this category. By "political choices," I mean where a scholar locates his or her 
arguments vis-a-vis these political circumstances. "Choice," perhaps is the wrong word, for it 
suggests a degree of intentionality that is perhaps impossible, but because I am a graduate student 
at the turn of the century and not at mid-century, I do think that there is a "politics of 
interpretation" and that historians should engage in this politics as consciously as possible. 
All history should, perhaps, be told in reverse, so that the successive lenses through 
which a historian's view of the past is filtered can be openly revealed to the reader, except that 
these lenses are not arranged in a line that can be traced back in linear order. Still, the most 
powerful lens here is undoubtedly ground from discussions of history-writing in my own 
present. This, I would argue (again in keeping with my moment), is how it should be, and will 
not be a problem as long as readers do not expect otherwise. 
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The narrative that follows tracks the variable of "modernity" in relation to variables of 
political circumstances and political choices starting with the publication of Norman's book and 
continuing until the publication of Harry Harootunian's Things Seen and Unseen in 1988. It 
concludes with a discussion of the relationship between modernity and politics in scholarship of 
the more recent past, the decade of the 1990s. 
Incompletely Modern: 
E. Herbert Norman and Japan in Marxian World History, 1925-1940 
In 1925, after World War I, which shifted the global balance of power in favor ofthe 
United States, 143 delegates and observers from what we would call today the Pacific Rim 
gathered in Honolulu to establish an international organization called the Institute of Pacific 
Relations. At its inception, the IPR consisted of a federation of national councils, each of which 
was represented by at least one member in a governing "Pacific Council." In following years, the 
number of national councils increased to include countries and colonies beyond the Pacific Rim: 
France, Great Britain, India, the Netherlands, and Pakistan, among others. Conferences continued 
to be held every two years or so at locations in Asia, North America, and Europe until the 
Institute's demise in 1960. Enthusiasts in the early 1930s used the term "conference diplomacy" 
to characterize what seemed to them to be a novel and noble effort to address contemporary 
international tensions through non-governmental means. I 
As originally proposed, the IPR was to be "a body of men and women deeply interested 
in the Pacific area, who meet and work, not as representatives of their Governments, or of any 
I Paul F. Hooper, "A Brief History of the Institute of Pacific Relations," Pacific University Asian Studies, 
http://mcel.pacificu.eduJaspac/papers/scholars/hooper/hooper.htm(accessedMarch9,2001). This online manuscript 
is an updated version of Paul F. Hooper, "The Institute of Pacific Relations and the Origins of Asian and Pacific 
Studies," Pacific Affairs 61, no. I (Spring 1988): 98-121. 
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other organizations, but as individuals in order to promote the well-being of the peoples 
concerned."Z From the beginning, however, an atmosphere of non-partisanship proved difficult 
to maintain. The opposition ofthe Japanese delegation to the presence of an informal delegation 
from Korea at the initial 1925 meeting compelled the organizing committee to agree that Korea 
would not be allowed independent representation at future conferences. At the 1929 conference 
in Kyoto, the first English-language version of the (spurious) "Tanaka Memorial" appeared, 
sparking conflict between the Chinese and Japanese delegations that, in the words of historian 
Paul F. Hooper, "effectively previewed the subsequent Manchurian crisis." In 1934, the 
Institute moved its research headquarters to Tokyo partly in order to make its voice more 
effectively heard in Asia, but the Japanese government, disliking IPR publications critical of its 
Manchuria policy, worked indirectly through the Japanese Council to force the office's return to 
New York. By 1937, when the IPR launched an "Inquiry Series" into the causes of the Sino-
Japanese War, majority opinion within the organization sympathized with China. The Japanese 
Council protested the Series' bias to no avail, and not long afterward withdrew from the IPR 
under government pressure.3 The higher the IPR's profile among policy makers, the more 
difficult it was to preserve its nature as a forum for dispassionate discussion. 
One of the contributors to the Inquiry Series was E. Herbert Norman, who at one point in 
the 1930s served as a research associate of the IPR's International Secretariat. The son of 
Canadian missionaries, Norman lived in Japan from the time of his birth in 1909 until his 
graduation from Kobe's Canadian Academy in 1926. He spent the next decade-and-a-half abroad, 
studying in Canada, England, and the United States. At the time of Japan's invasion southward 
into China in 1937, he was pursuing a Ph.D. in Japanese and Chinese history at Harvard. He 
received his degree in 1939, and when the IPR published his book Japan's Emergence as a 
2 Institute o/Pacific Relations: Honolulu Session, June 30-July 15, 1925 (Honolulu: Secretariat of the 
Institute of Pacific Relations, 1925), pp. 26-7, as quoted in Hooper, "The Institute of Pacific Relations," 100. 
3 Hooper, "A Brief History." 
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Modern State a year later, he was beginning a career as a Canadian diplomat with the Department 
of External Affairs, Ottawa.4 
Most English-language histories written before Japan's Emergence had been surveys and 
most had stopped with the end of the Tokugawa period in 1868. This can be said of the two 
most celebrated works published before 1940: James Murdoch's A History of Japan in three 
volumes5 and Sir George Sansom's Japan, A Short Cultural History.6 Less renowned today, but 
known to Norman, was the British diplomat J. H. Gubbins' The Making of Modern Japan, 
published in 1922.7 As captured by the subtitle, this book was "an account of the progress of 
Japan from pre-feudal days to constitutional government & the position of a great power, with 
chapters on religion, the complex family system, education, &c." The book still retained 
characteristics of a survey, however, covering as it did nearly thirteen centuries in the span of 316 
pages--from the Taika reforms of 646 through Japan's participation in the Paris Peace 
Conference of 1919. Whereas Gubbins devoted his first chapter to "Early History--The Great 
Reform--Adoption of Chinese Culture," Norman commenced immediately with "The Background 
of the Meiji Restoration." 
In place of a survey, Norman presented an analysis of a "central problem": "the rapid 
creation of a centralized, absolute state after the Meiji Restoration (1868), and the growth of an 
industrial economy under conditions of state patronage and control."8 This problem-based 
approach was in keeping with the premises ofthe IPR's Inquiry Series, which called for studies 
of ''the political and economic conditions [that] ... contributed to the present course of Japanese 
4 E. Herbert Norman, Japan's Emergence as a Modern State: Political and Economic Problems of the 
Meiji Period (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940). For biographical information, see John W. Dower, 
"E. H. Norman, Japan and the Uses of History," in E. H Norman, Origins of the Modern Japanese State: Selected 
Writings of E. H Norman, ed. John W. Dower (New York: Pantheon Books, 1975). 
5 James Murdoch, A History of Japan, 3 vols. (London: K. Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., ltd., 1925-6). 
6 G. B. Sansom, Japan, A Short Cultural History (London: The Cresset Press, 1936). 
7 J. H. Gubbins, The Making of Modern Japan (London: Seeley, Service & Co. Limited, 1922). 
8 E. Herbert Norman, Japan's Emergence as a Modern State: Political and Economic Problems of the 
Meiji Period (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940; reprint, 1946),3. 
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foreign policy and possible important future developments.,,9 The rapid creation of a centralized 
state and the growth of an industrial economy under the direction of this state were, for Norman, 
"those peculiarities of the Meiji settlement which have, to a great extent, conditioned modem 
Japanese economy, political life and foreign policy.,,10 
In choosing to focus on the Meiji period, Norman took his lead from Japanese 
scholarship. From the late 1920s into the 1930s, historians in Japan responded to the experience 
of unevenness II by employing Marxist terms to debate the extent to which the economy remained 
feudal. Participants in what has come to be called the "debate on Japanese capitalism" (Nihon 
shihonshugi ronso) looked back to the Meiji period to reevaluate the significance ofthe reforms 
undertaken during the late nineteenth century. Noro Eitaro, Hirano Y oshitaro, Yamada Moritaro, 
and others associated with the so-called "Lectures faction" (Koza-ha) argued that feudal or semi-
feudal relations survived the reforms, with the result that peasants suffered from high agricultural 
rents, which kept their standard ofliving low and made them a cheap source oflabor for the 
industrial sector. Critics ofthis view, including Kushida Tamizo, Sakisaka Itsuro, and Tsuchiya 
Takao, who were identified with the "Labor-Agriculture faction" (Rono-ha), claimed in rebuttal 
that changes after the Meiji Restoration eliminated the mechanisms of "non-economic coercion" 
(keizaigai kyosei) associated with feudalism. They pointed out that the reforms freed peasants 
to leave the land, and they attributed high rents to competition. 12 
Norman cited few sources from "the debate on Japanese capitalism," and only by forcing 
9 Edward C. Carter, foreword to Japan's Emergence, x. 
10 Norman, 3. 
II Here I am following Harry Harootunian's recent argument about the 1920s and '30s as a "historical 
conjuncture" marked by "the recognition of a vast field of economic and cultural unevenness" brought about by ''the 
war and the swift move to heavier forms of industrialization." Harry Harootunian, Overcome by Modernity: History, 
Culture, and Community in Interwar Japan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), xviii-xxi. Historians 
writing within the framework of , 'modernization" discussed this period in terms of the emergence ofa "dual 
economy." That is, they argued that a "modem" industrial capitalist sector began to sustain itself for the first time 
alongside a still sizable ''traditional'' agricultural/handicraft sector. See, for example, Sydney Crawcour, 
"Industrialization and Technological Change" in The Cambridge History of Japan, Vol. 6: The Twentieth Century, 
ed. Peter Duus (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). 
12 Yasukichi Yasuba, "Anatomy of the Debate on Japanese Capitalism," Journal of Japanese Studies 2, no. 
1 (1975): 63-69. 
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the argument can one pigeonhole his work as representative of either the K6za-ha or the R6n6-ha 
position. He argued, for example, that, as of the Meiji Restoration and the reforms of subsequent 
years, "Japan burst the fetters of feudal economy,,\3 (in line with the R6n6-ha view) and yet, in a 
discussion of the countryside, he referred to "the perpetuation of small-scale agriculture, high 
rents and a landlordism which has not completely lost its feudal coloring")4 (a K6za-ha 
perspective). The reason for linking him to this debate, therefore, lies not so much in his specific 
arguments as in his choice of period and the way in which he characterized economic and political 
change. 
According to Norman, a combination of internal and external threats to Japan's survival--
"the death agony of feudalism" and "the pressure exerted on Japan by the Western nations"--
pushed "military bureaucrats" to initiate change at an accelerated rate that resulted in an edited 
version of history with a crucial stage left out: "Japan skipped from feudalism into capitalism 
omitting the laissez-faire stage and its political counterpart, Victorian liberalism.,,)5 And so Japan 
became a modem state, but not a wholly satisfactory one. Rapid modernization came at the cost 
of democratic and liberal reform.)6 For Norman, and for Japanese Marxist historians, history 
moved forward in stages, defined in terms of economic, political, and social transformations that 
transpired earlier in England or, less often, in France. 
Japan's Emergence suggests that Norman cared most to demonstrate to an English-
reading audience that "Japanese development" did not transcend "all the laws of history and 
nature." No "miracle," "Japan's spectacular rise" was "the result of highly complex and as yet 
only partly explored phenomena, still demanding to be analyzed and interpreted.")? A Marxian 
framework suited his effort to place Japanese history in "world"--more accurately, western 
13 Norman, 11. 
14 Norman, 80. 
IS Norman, 47. 
16 Norman, 47. 
17 Norman, 207. 
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European--history. In his book, Japan is no longer quaint or exotic, but understandable and to be 
taken seriously. The argument reflects Japan's standing in world power politics at the time: an 
almost-but-not-quite equal of Great Britain and the United States, symbolized by the 5:5:3 and 
10:10:7 ratios forced upon Japan at the Washington and London naval conferences. 
Norman accepted a top-down, "autocratic" process of transformation as an inevitability, 
considering that "the tremendous task of modernization" had to be accomplished quickly and 
successfully if Japan were to "escape once and for all from the threat of foreign encroachment." 
At the same time, he agreed with Iwasaki Uichi that, while "in a period of transition someone 
must take the helm, and they [the bureaucrats] were expert pilots," ''the period of transition is 
now over."J8 The time had come for a more democratic society. For Norman, a left-leaning 
humanist progressive, the ideal democracy looked more socialist than liberal. Had he been more 
interested in revolution, he might have been a Marxist. 
Norman's work encouraged his English-reading audience to imagine a connection to 
people in Japan based upon a certain amount of shared modernity. Just one year after his book 
was published, however, war commenced between Japanese and American militaries, which cast 
the two country's people into a relationship of enmity and fostered perceptions of radical 
otherness. 
Not Modern But Japanese: 
Ruth Benedict and "Patterns of Culture," 1941-1945 
On December 8, 1941, Congress passed a joint resolution declaring a state of war between 
"the Imperial Government of Japan" and "the Government and the people of the United States." 
Although events of the day before at Pearl Harbor had certainly been a surprise for most 
18 Nonnan, 102-3. 
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Americans, U.S. involvement in World War II had not been unforeseen. Nonetheless, it was as of 
this date that the national need for personnel with knowledge of Japan and the Japanese became 
urgent, first for the war and then for the occupation that followed the enemy's anticipated defeat. 
During the war years, the Navy and the Army set up a number of training programs on 
university campuses around the country. The necessarily utilitarian goals of these programs 
resulted in pedagogical innovations that replaced a focus on reading foundational texts in classical 
languages with emphasis on rapid attainment of proficiency in contemporary speech and basic 
familiarity with the geography and culture of the area. 
A year before the war started, in December, 1940, the Navy surveyed its personnel 
registers for men proficient in spoken and written Japanese, and out of200,000 found only 
twelve that qualified. Similarly disappointing were the results of an inquiry into levels of civilian 
proficiency. Of the 600 people who the Navy expected to know Japanese, only fifty-six knew it 
well enough to justify further training. These fifty-six became the Navy's hope for translators 
and interpreters. Sent first to either Harvard or Berkeley, they were all at the University of 
Colorado at Boulder by the end of 1942.19 
The rigorous language program at Boulder had students working, according to one 
account, "fourteen hours a day, six days a week, fifty weeks per year." Following the arguments 
of anthropologists working in the 1920s and '30s--Franz Boas, Edward Sapir, and Leonard 
Bloomfield--emphasis was placed on language acquisition through imitation of native speakers. 
Outside the classroom, too, students were expected to speak in Japanese at all times. As future 
translators, they also had to learn reading and writing, which they did in ways that once again 
contrasted with the older philological techniques. Writing skills, for example, were most often 
learned in the context of dictation. Donald Keene and Edward Seidensticker, who after the war 
19 Marius B. Jansen, "Stages of Growth," in Japanese Studies in the United States: Part 1, History and 
Present Condition, Japanese Studies Series XVII, by The Japan Foundation (Ann Arbor: The Association for Asian 
Studies, 1988), 32-5. 
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went on to become famous scholars and translators of Japanese literature, were among those who 
passed through this program. In January, 1943, the Army began operation of a similarly elite and 
intensive program at the University of Michigan.20 
Less intensive and elite were the branch programs of the Army's Foreign Area and 
Language Program. Created in anticipation of the need for, and desirability of, an American 
presence in many regions ofthe world after the war, these branch programs balanced language 
instruction with classes designed to convey basic knowledge of an "area." Of the total of fifty-
five programs devoted to various areas of the world, eleven focused on Japan. At these centers, 
future assistants to Civil Affairs officers spent approximately fifteen hours per week studying 
spoken Japanese and another ten hours learning about Japanese history, geography, politics, and 
society. With few qualified instructors available and a scarcity of teaching materials, much 
improvisation had to go into the teaching of these area classes.21 
If many Americans were willing to be trained in order to contribute to the war effort, 
others were eager to lend expertise already achieved as the result of previous training. One such 
individual was Ruth Benedict, a cultural anthropologist at Columbia University who already in 
1939 joined with her close friend and fellow anthropologist Margaret Mead to organize a 
Committee for National Morale. In June, 1943, she agreed to replace her friend Geoffrey Gorer 
as head analyst at the Overseas Intelligence division of the Office of War Information (OWl). 
For the first year, she prepared brief reports on the cultures of Thailand, Romania, and the 
Netherlands, which included suggestions for culture-specific methods of "psychological warfare." 
In June, 1944, a friend in charge ofthe OWl's Foreign Morale Division asked her to produce a 
study of Japan.22 
During the occupation that followed the end of the war, in 1946, Benedict published a 
20 Jansen, 33-6. 
21 Jansen, 37. 
22 Christopher Shannon, "A World Made Safe for Differences: Ruth Benedict's 'The Chrysanthemum and 
the Sword,' American Quarterly 47, no. 4 (December 1995): 663-4. 
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revised and expanded version of her OWl report as The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns 
of Japanese Culture. 23 The "patterns" approach was one that she had worked out in the late 
1920s and early 1930s for her pathbreaking book Patterns of Culture. Published in 1934, the 
book urged readers to "imagine a great arc on which are ranged the possible interests provided 
either by the human age-cycle or by the environment or by man's various activities."24 The 
enormous dimensions of this arc meant that no individual or group could incorporate them all at 
any given time; selection was necessary. Different configurations of selections made for different 
patterns of culture. Benedict preferred to study "primitive societies" in order to illustrate her 
point, because "[i]t is possible to estimate the interrelation of traits in [these] simple 
environment[ s] in a way which is impossible in the cross-currents of our complex civilization. ,,25 
But her preference did not mean that she exempted "Western civilization" from her argument 
about the particularity of different patterns of culture. According to her diagnosis, 
[The] world-wide cultural diffusion [of white culture] has protected us as man had 
never been protected before from having to take seriously the civilizations of other 
peoples; it has given to our culture a massive universality that we have long ceased 
to account for historically, and which we read off rather as necessary and 
inevitable.26 
She called for "genuinely culture-conscious" individuals, "who can see objectively the socially 
conditioned behaviour of other peoples without fear and recrimination.'>27 
When Benedict turned to the study of Japanese culture during wartime, her basic stance 
did not change. She still advocated respect for difference. But what is striking about The 
23 Shannon, 664. Ruth Benedict, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1946). 
24 Ruth Benedict, Patterns of Culture, with a new preface by Margaret Mead (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 
Company, 1959), 24. 
2S Benedict, Patterns, 18. 
26 Benedict, Patterns, 6. 
27 Benedict, Patterns, 10-11. 
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Chrysanthemum and the Sword is the degree of difference posited between American and 
Japanese cultures. The book opens with the stark assertion that "[t]he Japanese were the most 
alien enemy the United States had ever fought in an all-out struggle," possessed, as they were, by 
"exceedingly different habits of acting and thinking."28 Denied "a field trip" by circumstances of 
war, Benedict had to grasp the pattern of these habits through conversations with Japanese-
Americans and through texts available in English, such as Sumie Mishima's My Narrow Isle and 
Lafcadio Heam's Japan: An Attempt at Interpretation.29 The pattern that she discerned set ''their 
reliance upon order and hierarchy" in contrast to "our faith in freedom and equality"30; their 
"situational realism"3! in contrast to our preference "for convictions on ideological matters,,32; 
their "particularistic codes" of behavior in contrast to our referrals to a "generalized virtue,'>33 and 
so on. 
In the context of the mid-1940s, Benedict's emphasis on the polar differences between 
American and Japanese culture allowed her to do two things at once. On the one hand, the 
emphasis could accommodate wartime feelings about the enemy of the "we are nothing like them" 
variety. On the other hand, the differences that she described encouraged a "good faith" 
occupation policy.34 The "situational realism" of the Japanese could be counted on to enable a 
transfer of their energies from war to peace35: "The Japanese ethic contains much which 
Americans repudiate, but American experiences during the occupation of Japan have been an 
excellent demonstration of how many favorable aspects a strange ethic can have.,,36 A "tough-
minded" progressive, Benedict worked for "a world made safe for differences," in contrast to the 
28 Ruth Benedict, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin Company, 1946; Cleveland: Meridian Books, 1967), 1. 
29 Benedict, Chrysanthemum, front matter and 5-7. 
30 Benedict, Chrysanthemum, 43. 
31 Benedict, Chrysanthemum, 175. 
32 Benedict, Chrysanthemum, 171. 
33 Benedict, Chrysanthemum, 212. 
34 Benedict, Chrysanthemum, 299. 
35 Benedict, Chrysanthemum, 172-3. 
36 Benedict, Chrysanthemum, 306. 
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"tender-minded," who "staked their hopes on convincing people of every comer of the earth that 
all the differences between East and West, black and white, Christian and Mohammedan, are 
superficial and that all mankind is really like-minded."37 
The Chrysanthemum and the Sword posits a relationship between culture and history that 
allows for change without destruction of a national essence: 
Encouraging cultural differences would not mean a static world. England did not 
lose her Englishness because an Age of Elizabeth was followed by an Age of 
Queen Anne and a Victorian Era. It was just because the English were so much 
themselves that different standards and different national moods could assert 
themselves in different generations.38 
In line with this view, the "Meiji reform" appears in Benedict's work as an example of an 
enduring Japanese pattern of culture--in this case, "the habit ofhierarchy"--and not as a moment 
of historical transformation, in Norman's Marxian terms, from the stage of feudalism to the stage 
of capitalism.39 Japanese culture, as Benedict saw it, had closer ties to other cultures of Asia and 
the Pacific, even to those of "primitive tribes,"40 than it did to the those of Europe, or, certainly, 
than it did to the that of the United States. The geographical area of the world that Japan was in 
mattered more to her than economic, social, and political changes that engendered commonalities 
between life as it was experienced in Japan and life as it was experienced in other industrializing 
countries. Primarily interested in the diversity of the ways in which life was lived around the 
world, she ignored or overlooked the effects of trade and technology that fostered similarities 
across "cultural patterns." 
Historians beginning their careers after the war thus had two powerful arguments to 
which they could respond: Japan's emergence as a modem state and the existence of a Japanese 
J7 Benedict, Chrysanthemum, 14-5. 
38 Benedict, Chrysanthemum, 15. 
39 See Chapter 4, "The Meiji Refonn," pp. 76-97. "Habit of hierarchy" appears on p. 8l. 
40 Benedict, Chrysanthemum, 8-9. 
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pattern of culture. More often than not, they accepted Norman's thesis that Japan emerged as a 
modem state during the Meiji period, even as they objected to his Marxian analysis. Like 
Benedict, they allowed for differences in motivations and attitudes, but they looked for those 
that would incline Japanese to act similarly to, not differently from, Americans. Japan appeared 
in their histories as a special case of successful modernization outside of Europe and the United 
States. 
A Model of Non-Western Modernity for the Developing World: 
John Whitney Hall and "Modernization," 1945-1968 
The latter half of the 1940s and the early 1950s were a time of overlap between the 
aftermath of World War II and the initiation of the Cold War. To take a symbolic example, in 
1951, Japanese and American representatives met in San Francisco to sign a peace treaty that 
officially marked the end of their WWII hostilities at the same time that Americans were fighting 
in Korea, ostensibly to stop the spread of Communism. In this geo-political context, the area-
studies approach developed during WWII was institutionalized and mobilized in the interest of 
winning the Cold War. While it was recognized that Americans needed to know about all areas of 
the world in order to protect their interests and to carry out President Truman's imperative to 
support "free peoples" resisting "attempted subjugation by armed minorities or outside 
pressures,,,41 some areas were strategically more important than others. In the words of historian 
Carol Gluck, "U.S. foreign relations made China and Japan loom larger than India, the Middle 
East more salient than Africa, and the Soviet Union more riveting than the for-decades-
4\ Quoted in Scott Lucas, Freedom's War: The u.s. Crusade Against the Soviet Union, 1945-56 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999), 6-7. 
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disappeared past of Eastem Europe.'>42 Especially following the establishment of the People's 
Republic of China in 1949, Japan, it was hoped, would become a "mighty bulwark against 
Moscow's domination of Asia."43 
Between 1945 and 1949 six area studies programs related to Japan were established at six 
of the country's top universities, including The East Asia Regional Studies Program at Harvard 
University and the Center for Japanese Studies at the University of Michigan, in 1947, and the 
East Asian Institute at Columbia University, in 1948. The key program for students beginning 
graduate study in Japanese history immediately after the war was the one at Harvard, where 
Edwin o. Reischauer taught with John K. Fairbank. John Whitney Hall and Marius Jansen, who 
soon became important figures themselves in the growing field, were among Reischauer's first 
students. 
Most American historians writing during this postwar/Cold War period--not just those 
interested in Japan--shared an attraction to the social sciences. Robert Bellah, a Harvard-trained 
sociologist who published his dissertation-based book Tokugawa Religion in 1957, observed in 
1985: 
It is hard for us to realize today how optimistic, how euphoric, was the 
atmosphere in American social science in that first decade after the end of World 
War II. The belief that social science was rapidly becoming scientific and the 
belief that its results would be socially ameliorative still held together to an extent 
hard to imagine today .... 44 
We can see this optimism in David Sills's introduction to the International Encyclopedia o/the 
42 Carol Gluck, "House of Mirrors: American History-Writing on Japan," in Imagined Histories: American 
Historians Interpret the Past, eds. Anthony Molho and Gordon S. Wood (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 
434. 
43 Sumner Welles, "Introduction to the First Edition (1950)," in Edwin o. Reischauer, The United States 
and Japan, 3d ed. (New York: The Viking Press, 1965), xx. 
44 Robert N. Bellah, "Introduction to the Paperback Edition," Tokugawa Religion: The Cultural Roots of 
Modern Japan (New York: The Free Press, 1985), xii. The original 1957 edition of the book was published with a 
different subtitle: "The Values of Pre-Industrial Japan." 
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Social Sciences, published in 1968: "Regardless of what we may think about the quality of life in 
the pre-scientific era, ... the satisfactions and material advantages that derive from understanding 
and from some measure of control seem in the 1960s to be mankind's best hope for a measure of 
contentment."45 Cooperation between social scientists and institutions of all types--"government 
agencies; business and industry; schools, colleges, and universities; philanthropic foundations; 
religious bodies; and voluntary associations"46 --flourished in the hope of rationally planning and 
managing change for the purpose of bringing about economically prosperous liberal democratic 
societies. 
The general American hostility to Marxism during this period of anti-Communism 
notwithstanding, Daniel Lerner, a contributor to the International Encyclopedia, quoted 
approvingly from Das Kapital: "The country that is more developed industrially only shows, to 
the less developed, the image of its own future.,,47 American scholars of the 1950s and '60s 
generally believed this version of progressive history, which located countries along a timeline of 
development. This belief in and of itself was not new--Lerner was, after all, citing Marx, a 
historian of the mid-nineteenth century--but what seems to have been distinctive about this post-
WWII and Cold War period is that many American scholars endeavored consciously to transcend 
the particularities of their viewpoint as culturally-defined "Westerners." In Hall's opinion, 
published in 1960, "[t]he postwar world of Western scholarship has sought conscientiously to 
find some objective ground from which to approach the problem of comparison.,,48 According to 
Lerner, "[a]n important step was taken when development economists reached the consensus 
that their subject matter was, in the words ofW. Arthur Lewis, 'the growth of output per head 
45 David L. Sills, "Introduction," in International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, ed. David L. Sills, 
vol. 1 (The Macmillan Company & The Free Press, 1968), xx. 
46 Sills, xix. 
41 Daniel Lerner, "Modernization: Social Aspects," in International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, 
ed. David L. Sills, vol. 10 (The Macmillan Company & The Free Press, 1968),386. 
48 John Whitney Hall, "Changing Conceptions of the Modernization of Japan," in Changing Japanese 
Attitudes Toward Modernization, ed. Marius B. Jansen (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), 10-11. 
15 
of population. »049 The concept of per capita income gave economists a measure for comparing 
levels of development that was not pegged to the level of development of a specific country. On 
the scale of per capita income, any country could set the benchmark. De facto, of course, more 
often than not this benchmark and others were set by the United States, but a number of factors--
including the widely held belief that the American way of life was a better model for the world 
than the Soviet one--prevented, or at least discouraged, American scholars from exploring the 
irony of a situation in which aspirations to objectivity produced a system of rankings that 
privileged one's own country. 
Social scientists studying social change and trying to figure out how to direct and manage 
it noted that economic development did not occur unless a number of other factors were present. 
"Modernization" became the term that they used to describe the broader process of change that 
"produces the societal environment in which rising output per head is effectively incorporated."50 
Max Weber's early twentieth-century essay Die protestantischen Sekten und der Geist des 
Kapitalismus, translated by Talcott Parsons as The Protestant Ethic and The Spirit a/Capitalism, 
assumed theoretical importance in this contexe l Parson's Weber argued that "[o]ne of the 
fundamental elements of the spirit of modem capitalism, and not only of that but of all modem 
culture: rational conduct on the basis of the idea of the calling, was born ... from the spirit of 
Christian asceticism."52 Weber's argument could be and was used to buttress post-WWII 
arguments that attitudes and motivations needed to be assessed in order to understand a society's 
49 Lerner, 387. 
50 Lerner, 387. 
51 "When Talcott Parsons fIrst translated The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism in 1930, Weber 
was moderately well known among scholarly specialists in Germany; but sociology in that country was a tiny, 
struggling fIeld, soon to be snuffed out by the Nazis coming to power in 1933. In England and France, Weber was 
scarcely regarded at all. Parsons proceeded to make Weber into a truly major fIgure, taking The Protestant Ethic as 
the exemplar of how sociology should be done: showing the role of ideas and values rather than materialist 
reduction of the Marxian or even the Durkheimian sort; and showing the importance of verstehen, the methodology 
of understanding subjective orientations to social action." Randall Collins, new introduction to Max Weber, The 
Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, trans. Talcott Parsons, 2d ed. (Los Angeles: Roxbury Publishing 
Company), xxix. 
52 Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, trans. Talcott Parsons, 2d ed. (Los 
Angeles: Roxbury Publishing Company), 180. 
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potential for economic development. Like many of his colleagues, Robert Bellah observed that 
"Japan alone of the non-Western nations was able to take over very rapidly what it needed of 
Western culture in order to transform itself into a modem industrial nation." As a student of 
Parsons at Harvard, he asked: "[W]as there a functional analogue to the Protestant ethic in 
Japanese religion?"53 He found several examples in the religions of the Tokugawa period, 
including Shingaku, a religious movement of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, which he 
singled out for close analysis. 54 
At around the time that Bellah published his book, Robert E. Ward and John W. Hall at 
the University of Michigan drafted a proposal for a series of conferences on "the problems of 
modernization in Japan." Together they secured funding from the Ford Foundation for a six-part 
series titled Conference on Modem Japan, which met almost annually from 1962 to 1968.55 A 
preliminary gathering took place in Hakone, Japan, during the late summer of 1960. For five 
days, scholars invited from Japanese, American, British, Australian, and Canadian institutions 
"began an effort at revaluation of the concept of modernization around the Japanese example.,,56 
At the Hakone Conference, key components of a definition of modernization prepared in 
the United States--a list of descriptive characteristics culled primarily from Almond and 
Coleman's The Politics of Developing Areas--which appeared "objective" as long as American 
scholars were talking to one another, were soon shown to be laden with parochial assumptions. 
Ouchi Tsutomu of Tokyo University objected to what seemed to him to be the excessively 
"capitalistic" connotations of the features on the list. Discussion prompted the scholars to reject 
S3 Bellah, 2-3. 
54 For the Shingaku case study, see Bellah, chapter VI, 133-177. 
55 The six conferences and the edited volumes that they produced were as follows: Bermuda, 1962: Marius 
B. Jansen, ed., Changing Japanese Attitudes Toward Modernization (1965); Estes Park, Colorado, June, 1963: 
William W. Lockwood, ed., The State and Economic Enterprise in Japan: Essays in the Political Economy of 
Growth (1965); Bermuda, January, 1963: R. P. Dore, ed., Aspects of Social Change in Modern Japan (1967); 
Bermuda, 1965: Robert E. Ward, ed., Political Development in Modern Japan (1968); Puerto Rico, 1966: Donald 
H. Shively, ed., Tradition and Modernization in Japanese Culture (1971); Puerto Rico, 1968: James WIlliam 
Morley, ed., Dilemmas of Growth in Prewar Japan (1971). All six volumes were published by Princeton 
University Press. 
S6 Hall, "Changing Conceptions," 15. 
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such terms terms as "urbanization," "commercialization," and, perhaps most significantly, "high 
per capita income" on the premise that they "were too specific in their reference to the advanced 
industrial societies ofthe West."57 Following a suggestion made by Benjamin Schwartz, a 
professor of Chinese history at Harvard, participants centered their discussion of modernization 
on Weber's concept of Zwecksrationalitdt, or "the rationality of means and ends. ,,58 A focus on 
rationalization seemed to be more accommodating of a variety of economic and political systems-
-especially those of the Soviet Union, which mattered to the Japanese historians--at the same 
time that it captured the nature of "the great transformation" taking place around the world. 59 
In contrast to their American colleagues, most Japanese historians of the postwar 
generation were Marxist. Norman's 1940 study of the Meiji Restoration had been translated by 
Okubo Genji and published first by Tokiji Tsushinsha in 1947 and then by Iwanami Shoten in 
1953.60 The enthusiastic reception the book received contrasted with the response of American 
historians of the same time period, who viewed the book as a classic but thought it to be too 
driven by Marxist theory. 
Toyama Shigeki challenged the purpose of the Hakone meeting from the outset: "Most 
Japanese scholars, especially historians use 'modernization' in the sense of the process of 
transition to a capitalistic society .... I would like to have it made clear why a totally new 
conception, completely divorced from [the usual modes of thought], is considered necessary."61 
He explained that "[t]he greatest concern of our scholars until quite recently has been with the 
problem of how to democratize the politics and thought of our country."62 With memories of the 
fascism and militarism of the war years still fresh, and with the even more recent experience of 
failed protest against the renewal ofthe U.S.-Japan Security Treaty (Anpo) even fresher, 
57 Hall, "Changing Conceptions," 18-9. 
58 Hall, "Changing Conceptions," 21-2. 
59 Hall, "Changing Conceptions," 16,26, 33. 
60 The Japanese title of Japan's Emergence as a Modern State was Nihon ni okeru kindai kokka no seiritsu. 
61 Hall, "Changing Conceptions," 38. 
62 Hall, "Changing Conceptions," 39. 
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Japanese historians could not easily accept the "open approach" to the question of the 
relationship between democracy and modernity advocated by American participants in the 
Conference. 
While American historians at the start of the 1960s were confident that their way of life 
was best, they were also anxious, in the context of the Cold War, about the extent to which the 
rest of the world agreed with them. If their confidence helps to explain why they did not feel the 
need openly to declare and defend their commitment to liberal democracy, then their anxiety 
contributed to their eagerness for their Japanese colleagues to see things their way. In Marius 
Jansen's opinion, 
The free and full discussion of those five days served two functions. It helped to 
sharpen awareness of conceptual problems common to all future seminars, and it 
served to focus the attention of social scientists in Japan upon the idea of 
approaching their country's modem transformation in this manner.63 
In his introductory chapter based on the Hakone meeting, Hall did not mention Norman. 
According to his presentation, the only historians ever to be interested in Marxist analysis were 
Japanese: "Despite the popularity of the Western liberal ideal, for the Japanese intellectual, 
Marxism has seemed the most useful key to the discovery of the essentials of Western 
civilization and of the long range changes affecting the modem world.,,64 But even for "the 
Japanese intellectual," he claimed, the appeal of orthodox Marxist interpretation was breaking 
down. He mentioned Inoue Kiyoshi and Eguchi Bokuro as two young historians whose recent 
publications suggested an interest in moving away from a traditional Marxist scheme. He 
admitted that their "skepticism stems less from a recognition of the limitations of deterministic 
theory than from a pan-Asian sense of revolt against subservience to the West," but he 
63 Marius Jansen, "Introduction," Changing Japanese Attitudes, 4. 
64 Hall, "Changing Conceptions," 13. 
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nevertheless tried to make a connection between their search for a new historical framework and 
the attempt being made simultaneously by "scholars in the West [who] have sought to work out 
a universal concept of modernization detached from familiar assumptions about Westernization 
or democratization."65 His roundabout, but unmistakable, suggestion was that a "universal" 
concept of modernization might fill the space being opened by the breakdown of Marxist 
orthodoxy in Japan. As a fellow graduate student once joked trenchantly in a Columbia seminar, 
Changing Japanese Attitudes Toward Modernization, the title ofthe volume in which Hall's 
chapter was published, was a challenge felt by American scholars as much as it was their 
description of historical developments.66 
One must be careful, nonetheless, not to overemphasize the significance of the concept of 
modernization to history-writing during this period. Dorothy Ross, in a historiographical essay 
published in the late 1990s, noted that "[f]ew historical studies have in fact openly claimed 
modernization as the theoretical basis of their work.,,67 Hall, reflecting on the theoretical basis of 
the book considered his major contribution to the field, Government and Local Power in Japan, 
500 to 1700, in fact mentioned Benedict's "cultural anthropological approach." He certainly 
sounded like Benedict in his introduction, where he wrote that "[t]he patterns of cultural 
behavior in Japan have been quite varied. But this variety has been contained within well-defined 
limits, and the predominant motifs have frequently repeated."68 His methodology, too, was not 
unlike that of an anthropologist. Shortly after the end of W orId War II, Hall had been 
instrumental in setting up a "field station" in Okayama, where professors and graduate students 
affiliated with the University of Michigan's Center for Japanese Studies organized and carried 
65 Hall, "Changing Conceptions," 14. 
66 Ananda Martin, spring 2000. 
67 Dorothy Ross, "The New and Newer Histories: Social Theory and Historiography in an American Key," 
in Imagined Histories: American Historians Interpret the Past, eds. Anthony Molho and Gordon S. Wood 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press), 93. 
68 John Whitney Hall, Government and Local Power in Japan, 500-1700: A Study Based on Bizen 
Province (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966),4-5. 
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out research projects from April, 1950, to June, 1955.69 Government and Local Power focused 
on Bizen, the historical province in which Okayama was located. Hall described his methodology 
as "the technique of concentrating field observation and documentary analysis upon a single 
geographical region and thus to defme a historical case study which, though limited in scope, 
nonetheless contains all the institutional ingredients of the larger national community.,,70 
Without familiarity with the framework of the discussion about modernization, however, 
one would have difficulty understanding what fascinated Hall about institutional development. 
His treatment of the topic seems excruciatingly detailed and antiquarian until one recognizes the 
link made at the time between transformation of institutions and comparative modern 
development. Institutional history was a place to look for rationalization, and Hall found it in 
"[t]he tendency offamilially based power groupings to become 'rationalized' and to develop 
what Max Weber would call patrimonial officialdom for purposes of administration."71 
Moreover, his plan to write a more detailed book on the chronologically later Tokugawa period72 
needs to be read in the context of the rhetorical question he posed in his analysis of the Hakone 
meeting: "Can we not say, then, that the process of rationalization has tended to pick up 
momentum as human society has gained the means to purposefully achieve rational control of its 
physical and social environment?,,73 Judging by the title of a volume that Hall co-edited with 
Marius Jansen in the late 1960s, he felt that the process of rationalization picked up quite a bit of 
momentum in the years after 1700. Studies in the Institutional History of Early Modern Japan 
rendered the Tokugawa period a time of transition to modernity,74 in contrast to Norman's 
69 "History of the Center for Japanese Studies," http://www.umich.eduJ-iinet/cjs/about/cjshist.html 
(accessed April 8, 2001). 
10 Hall, Government and Local Power, vii. 
11 Hall, Government and Local Power, 7. 
12 Hall did not intend his study to end in 1700; he considered it an "introduction to a considerably more 
detailed analysis ofthe political institutions of Okayama during the Tokugawa period" (Hall, Government and 
Local Power, vii). 
13 Hall, "Changing Conceptions," 33. 
14 John W. Hall and Marius B. Jansen, eds., Studies in the Institutional History of Early Modern Japan 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968). 
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characterization of the period as one marked by "one of the most conscious attempts in history 
to freeze society in a rigid hierarchical mold. ,,75 
The combination of confidence and anxiety that fostered a commitment to the 
modernization approach among the WWII generation of historians did not continue beyond its 
historical moment of the mid-l 940s to mid-1960s. Nor did the relative consensus on matters of 
approach and epistemology survive the 1960s. As WWII disposed these American historians to 
approve the national leadership's vision of the United States as the model for the rest of the 
world to follow, so the Vietnam War inclined the next generation to denounce it. 
Shifting Focus to Methodological Innovation and American Imperialism: 
The Two Lefts of Harry Harootunian and John Dower, 1968-1975 
Looking at the world in the mid-1960s and noting that, in "transitional societies," 
people's wants were multiplying at a rate faster than the capacities of these societies to provide 
for them, Lerner suggested that "we are passing from a putative 'revolution of rising 
expectations' ... to an incipient 'revolution of rising frustration. ",76 His essay would have been 
richer had he included mention of the "revolution of rising frustration" taking place in societies 
assumed to have already made the transition to modern standards of living. If rising expectations 
were met in the United States with passage of the Civil Rights Act in 1964, rising frustration 
came to the fore in the summers of urban race riots that began with the Watts Riot of 1965. As 
the decade continued, the feminist movement, political assassinations, and protests against the 
Vietnam War exposed and exacerbated divisions within American society. 
"Nonnan, 12. 
16 Daniel Lerner, "Modernization: Social Aspects," in International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences 
(1968), 391. 
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The year 1968 appears in as a turning point for the field of Japanese studies. The least 
radical indication of change was highlighted by Hall in a speech he delivered in 1971. In his 
words, "as the series of seminars which comprised the Conference on Modem Japan was 
drawing to a close, interest in the success side of modernization had begun to fade. ,m The 
seminar held in 1968, the sixth and last of the series, he pointed out, addressed the troubled side 
of modernization, focusing on Dilemmas a/Growth in Prewar Japan and asking the question 
"What went wrong?"7S But "growth," he seems to have been unable to see, was still the issue. 
Fundamental challenges to the modernization approach came from younger scholars who 
committed, in the words of Carol Gluck, "intellectual parricide.,,79 One important challenge came 
from Harry Harootunian, who studied under Hall at the University of Michigan in the 1950s, and 
another came from John Dower, who completed his degree at Harvard in 1972 under the direction 
of Edwin Reischauer and Albert Craig. 
Trained during a time of peak optimism about social science by one of the most 
vociferous advocates of objectivity in historical writing, Harootunian revealed little of his own 
political views in his early published writings. One can read into "The Economic Rehabilitation 
of the Samurai in the Early Meiji Period,"so an article based upon his Ph.D. dissertation, criticism 
of government policy that put growth before all else, insofar as he argued that "samurai 
rehabilitation was subordinated to the general program of the Meiji government, one which took 
the form of making Japan economically independent and militarily powerful." But he muted his 
criticism by observing that, despite the failure of the rehabilitation policy to satisfY the samurai's 
financial needs, ''there is little doubt that the program had significance for the development of 
77 John Hall, "Thirty Years ofJapanese Studies in America," Transactions of the International Conference 
of Orienta lists in Japan, no. 16 (1971): 31. 
78 Hall, "Thirty Years," 32. 
79 Carol Gluck, "House of Mirrors: American History-Writing on Japan," in Imagined Histories: American 
Historians Interpret the Past, eds. Anthony Molho and Gordon S. Wood (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 
441. 
80 Harry D. Harootunian, "The Economic Rehabilitation of the Samurai in the Early Meiji Period," Journal 
of Asian Studies 19, no. 4 (August 1960): 433-444. 
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modern Japanese society": "It certainly contributed to the process of capital accumulation, it 
stimulated growth of an entrepreneurial class, and it provided a labor force upon which Japanese 
industry could be expanded."sl This balanced view is what one would expect from a scholar 
trained in the ways of "value-free" history. 
When Harootunian began breaking away from his mentor's approach, he did so more 
through criticisms of methodology than through overt political attacks. In March, 1968, two 
months after The Conference on Modern Japan held the last of its six meetings, he joined Bernard 
Silberman, Kozo Yamamura, and David Abosch at an Association for Asian Studies (AAS) 
meeting in Philadelphia in presenting a paper on Norman's work as a scholar. The historians 
subsequently published their papers in the Winter, 1968-69, and Spring, 1969, volumes of Pacific 
Affairs. Harootunian opened his article with a scathing retelling of the devastating effects of anti-
communist zealotry in the United States upon Norman, who committed suicide in 1957 partly in 
response to news that he was once again under investigation by the U.S. Senate Internal Security 
subcommittee.s2 But, he continued, "[i]t is not the object of this article to discuss either the 
politics of U.S. internal security or the morality of the Norman case."S3 The object, as he defined 
it, was to recall and appreciate Norman's talents as a historian. He agreed with Maruyama 
Masao, who contrasted Norman to "his North American contemporaries who came to Japan in 
the immediate post-war years, with little more preparation than a control ofthe Japanese 
language." Norman, in addition to being fluent in Japanese, "suffered no deficiencies" in "the 
crucial area of historical consciousness.,,84 "Any reader of Japan's Emergence," Harootunian 
argued, "will immediately recognize that Norman ... substituted analysis for narrative, process 
for biography and theory for the 'natural arrangement of facts. ",85 Norman did not succeed 
8\ Harootunian, "Economic Rehabilitation," 435. 
82 Harry D. Harootunian, "E. H. Nonnan and the Task for Japanese History," Pacific Affairs 41, no. 4 
(Winter 1968-69): 545-6. 
83 Harootunian, "E. H. Nonnan," 546. 
84 Harootunian, "E. H. Nonnan," 547. 
85 Harootunian, "E. H. Nonnan," 548. 
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absolutely, but Harootunian took it as a sign of his achievement that he set a task for himselfthat 
he could not hope to accomplish completely. 86 
Lauding Norman's talents as a historian included, for Harootunian, praising him for laying 
down the task of "com[ing] to terms with that process which somehow guaranteed the promise 
ofmodernity."87 The following passage is worth quoting at length, because it shows how 
Harootunian could support the study of modernization at the same time that he disagreed with 
the approaches taken by his teachers. Referring to the R6n6-ha versus K6za-ha debates in the 
1930s, Harootunian wrote: 
Norman learned from the Japanese what many of us still have not: that Marxism, 
rather than representing a tired formula (historians never tire of showing that its 
predictions are wrong), offered Japanese historians, witness to the agonies of 
modernity, not only governing metaphors with which to organize a specific 
historical experience which had not yet ended, but also a general theory for 
engaging the process of modernization itself. In a certain sense this debate in the 
1930s was itself confirmation of the fact that Marx's greatest achievement was his 
identification of modernization and modernity as an analytic category. Norman 
knew this and it is for this reason that he refused to accept modernization as an 
historical process representing either the descent into an abyss or the ascent to a 
more elevated way of life. Rather what he was concerned with was to show, 
summoning the example of LeFebvre, that modernization in Japan was a process 
which, owing to the choices or selection of a specific route, resulted in significant 
political consequences.88 
Whether or not Norman, who in Japan's Emergence more often used the word 
86 Harootunian, "E. H. Nonnan," 552. 
87 Harootunian, "E. H. Nonnan," 549. 
88 Harootunian, "E. H. Nonnan," 550. 
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"industrialization" than "modernization," "knew" that "Marx's greatest achievement was his 
identification of modernization and modernity as an analytic category" is here irrelevant. The 
point is that Harootunian figured this out for himself. Thinking about how to use the concept of 
modernity in interpreting the past and in writing history subsequently absorbed much of his 
scholarly energy. 
Regardless of the extent to which Harootunian considered modernization an important 
analytic category, in the late 1960s the term was not used in the way that he thought it should be 
and, besides, he wanted to find other strategies for interpretation. At the Conference on the 
Status of Studies in Modem Japanese History, held in New York from November 8-9, 1968, he 
argued for the need for a new approach to the study of Tokugawa intellectual history: 
The excessive concern with modernization is an ideological stance toward the 
study of thought that defines the subjects to be studied. It is now no longer 
adequate, however, to 'unmask' ideologies based on the dichotomy of 
modern/anti-modem. Approaches embracing the totality of thought in a given 
period, such as Geertz's Ideology as a Cultural System, are needed.89 
In other words, if historians were to study "the totality of thought" in the Tokugawa period, for 
its own sake, they might learn something unexpected about the relationship between thought and 
society. The "lock-step approach" of modernization should be abandoned in favor of "going 
barefoot" through the sources and considering discontinuity as much as continuity. 90 
Although political concerns contributed to Harootunian's break with the postwar social 
science usage of modernization, he emphasized methodological issues in his writings--and he 
89 SSRC-ACLS Joint Committee on Japanese Studies, Japanese Studies in the United States: A Report on 
the State of the Field, Current Resources and Future Needs (February 1970),223. The report contained a series of 
appendices in which the results of SSRC-sponsored conferences on the state of Japanese studies in a number of 
academic disciplines were discussed. In the fall of 1968, Albert Craig of Harvard University organized the 
Conference on the Status of Studies in Modem Japanese History, held in New York from November 8-9. 
Harootunian, at the time a professor at the University of Rochester, bore responsibility for commenting upon 
Tokugawa intellectual history. 
90 SSRC-ACLS Joint Committee on Japanese Studies, 223-4. 
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emphasized them with an acute consciousness of being a historian, rather than a Japan specialist. 
Japan's Emergence was important to him as ''the first really serious book [he] read on Japan," 
by which he meant that it "[met] the critical standards of European historiography."91 
Contributing to American knowledge about Japan, as encouraged by area studies, mattered less to 
Harootunian than establishing the study of Japanese history as a "serious" discipline. 
If Harootunian couched his objection to the approach represented by The Conference on 
Modem Japan in terms of methodology, Dower expressed his in those of politics. As a graduate 
student, he joined the editorial board of the Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, the first issue 
of which was published in 1968. According to the "Editorial Comment" in an issue of the 
following year, the Bulletin functioned "to lay bare political assumptions and to support the aims 
of scholars on the Left while reminding those wedded to scholastic 'purity' of the implications of 
their own assumptions. ,,92 Dower contributed an article to this issue titled "The Eye of the 
Beholder: Background Notes on the U.S.-Japan Military Relationship," in which he criticized 
American assumptions about the necessity for and benefits of a military alliance between Japan 
and the United States.93 In 1972, he published the third version of a paper that charged the Nixon 
Doctrine with representing "little more than the new face of American empire."94 A New Left 
historian, Dower began his career first and foremost as a critic of postwar and Cold War 
American imperialism. 
In the early 1970s, Dower, like Harootunian, resurrected Norman as a model historian, 
though not for the same purpose. Dower turned to Norman as a scholar who was open about his 
political sympathies, as opposed to historians devoted to "objective" or "value-free" scholarship 
91 Harootunian, "E. H. Nonnan," 549. 
92 "Editorial Comment," Bulletin o/Concerned Asian Scholars 2, no. 1 (October 1969): 4. 
93 John W. Dower, "The Eye of the Beholder: Background Notes on the U.S.-Japan Military Relationship," 
Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars 2, no. 1 (October 1969): 15-31. 
9~ John W. Dower, "Asia and the Nixon Doctrine: The New Face of Empire," in Open Secret: The 
Kissinger-Nixon Doctrine in Asia, eds. Virginia Brodine and Mark Selden (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 
1972), 134. 
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who submerged their political commitments. In 1975, three years after receiving his degree, he 
published Origins of the Modern Japanese State: Selected Writings of E. H Norman, for which he 
wrote a hefty, hundred-page introduction. Titled "E. H. Norman, Japan and the Uses of 
History," the introduction exposed a tight relationship between what Dower called "the 
government-foundation-university interlock" and the kind of scholarship produced by American 
scholars about Asia.95 As a former Harvard student and a member of the Committee of 
Concerned Asian Scholars, he knew something of the (then alleged, now accepted as real) 
connections between faculty in charge of area studies programs and the Central Intelligence 
Agency.96 In the case ofthe Japan field, the most relevant instance of "government-found at ion-
university interlock" seems to have occurred between the CIA and the Ford Foundation, which 
together are said to have played a role in setting the "modernization" research agenda in the 
1950s.97 Dower did not go so far as to suggest a conspiracy, but he did want readers to take note 
of "the fact that much American scholarship on Japan has tended to be congruent with the 
objectives of the American Government, and that concerns of the cold war have influenced 
scholarship concerning the prewar development of Japan.'>9g Reischauer, Jansen, and Hall, 
needless to say, did not emerge from Dower's introduction in favorable light. As someone 
"concerned not only with the uses of power but also its abuses, and with issues of human values 
95 John W. Dower, "E. H. Nonnan, Japan and the Uses of History," in E. H. Norman, Origins of the 
Modern Japanese State: Selected Writings ofE. H. Norman, ed. John W. Dower (New York: Pantheon Books, 
1975),33. 
% A contribution titled "An Exchange: The C.I.A. at Harvard" was published in the CCAS Newsletter, vol. 
1, no. 2 (October 1968), pp. 6-12. For recent discussion of "the government-foundation-university interlock," see 
Mark Selden, ed., "Asia, Asian Studies, and the National Security State: A Symposium," Bulletin of Concerned 
Asian Scholars 29, no. 1 (Jan. - Mar. 1997), pp. 3-60. A revised version of Cumings' contribution, "Boundary 
Displacement: The State, the Foundations, and International and Area Studies during and after the Cold War," pp. 
6-26, appears in Cumings, Parallax Visions: Making Sense of American-East Asian Relations at the End of the 
Century (Durham: Duke University Press, 1999), pp. 173-204. The series of which this book is a part, Asia-
Pacific: Culture, Politics, and Society, is edited by Rey Chow, H. D. Harootunian, and Masao Miyoshi. 
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progressed. 
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1964), which Hall referred to in his chapter on "Changing Conceptions of the Modernization of Japan," p. 20, n. 
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rather than 'value-free' examination of diversification and decision-making,"99 Norman 
unquestionably appeared to have been the superior historian, if not human being. 
Dower's ad hominem attack elicited a much stronger reaction from scholars committed to 
the modernization approach than did Harootunian's call for methodological innovation. Hall 
responded with a reassertion of what might be called the pioneer argument: Norman's work 
deserved to be considered a classic, but thirty years of subsequent scholarship turned it into an 
outdated resource for the student of the 1970s. Continuing to place high value on objective 
treatment of reliable data, Hall cited "[ t ]he stream of empirical studies which have come out since 
1950, many of which are based on new and more strictly primary materials" to support his 
claim. lOO George Akita engaged in what Herbert Bix called "footnote excavation,"IOI digging 
through four chapters of Japan's Emergence to "prove" that Norman did not deserve admiration 
for his skills as a historian. He argued that Norman did not use many primary sources; that his 
citations revealed greater reliance on English than on secondary Japanese language sources; that a 
significant number of his concepts and conclusions were already available in English language 
sources; and that some of his key concepts were based on hasty scholarship and distortion of 
sources.102 Neither Hall nor Akita addressed the point made by Dower (and by Harootunian) that 
Norman's book was still worth reading despite errors of fact or interpretation because of the 
important questions to which it directs the student's attention. A three-way divide opened up 
among participants in The Conference on Modern Japan, Harootunian, and Dower. 
Over the course of his career, Dower stayed with the theme of problems in Japan-U.S. 
relations. In 1979, he published an expanded version of his dissertation, in which he adopted a 
99 Dower, "E. H. Norman," 86. 
100 John Whitney Hall, "E. H. Norman on Tokugawa Japan," Journal of Japanese Studies 3, no. 2 (1977): 
368. 
101 Herbert P. Bix, "The Pitfalls of Scholastic Criticism: A Reply to Norman's Critics," Journal of 
Japanese Studies 4, no. 2 (I978): 393. 
102 George Akita, "An Examination ofE. H. Norman's Scholarship," Journal of Japanese Studies 3, no. 2 
(1977): 379-381. 
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term coined by the Japanese left to characterize Japan's postwar relationship to the United 
States as one of "subordinate independence," and in which he wrote of the emergence of a "new 
imperium" in Asia based upon the slogan "U.S.-Japan economic cooperation."103 War Without 
Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War, published in 1986, exposed the virulence of wartime 
racism on both sides of the Pacific. 104 Japan in War and Peace: Selected Essays continued the 
wartime and postwar focus,105 and, most recently, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World 
War II returned to the theme of American imperialism with a chapter titled "Neocolonial 
Revolution."I06 Since the publication of his first book, Dower has turned consistently to non-
academic presses, reflecting a goal to communicate with a broad audience. Extended meditations 
on methodological concerns do not find their way into his work. His contribution lies primarily 
in his determined effort to raise awareness about the politics of Japan-U.S. relations and their 
effects upon ordinary people, although one might also appreciate him as a pioneer of what has 
come to be called "transwar" studies. 107 Dower's focus on Japan-U.S. relations, one might say, 
gave him a shortcut to a comparative framework that bypassed the need to consider "modernity." 
Following his resurrection of Norman's work as an emblem of theoretically-informed 
history and his announcement that it was a time for a new approach to the history of Tokugawa 
thought in 1968, Harootunian launched a search for alternatives to the Hakone version of the 
103 J. W. Dower, Empire and Aftermath: Yoshida Shigeru and the Japanese Experience, 1878-1954 
(Cambridge: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1979),369-470. 
104 John W. Dower, War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War (New York: Pantheon Books, 
1986). 
105 John W. Dower, Japan in War and Peace: Selected Essays (New York: New Press, 1993). 
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Company, 1999),203-224. 
107 In Empire and Aftermath, Dower stated that one of the reasons he focused on Yoshida was that the 
man's accomplishments "reflected a personal, political, and ideological consistency which, in the larger view, 
repudiates the conventional easy separation of 'pre-surrender' and 'post-surrender,' or 'prewar' and 'postwar,' or 
'Imperial' and 'democratic' Japan" (2). Looking back on this book in the 1990s, Dower wrote it "was motivated by 
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postsurrender periods." John W. Dower, "Sizing Up (and Breaking Down) Japan," in The Postwar Development of 
Japanese Studies in the United States, ed. Helen Hardacre (Boston: Brill, 1998), 31. Sheldon Garon included 
Dower's book alongside studies by Chalmers Johnson (1982), Andrew Gordon (1985), and himself(1987) in 
discussion of studies that "demonstrate that much of what makes up postwar Japan was built on the statist 
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metanarrative of modernization that has yet to end. In his search for alternatives, he followed the 
"linguistic tum" of the late 1970s and 1980s and consequently alienated those of his colleagues 
who did not join him. His experiments brought him, by the year 2000, to the formulation "co-
eval modernity," which offered the possibility of a politically acceptable (in the context of the 
1990s) replacement for "modernization," a point addressed in this paper's conclusion. 
In a 1988 review of yet another publication about Norman's life and scholarship, 
Harootunian criticized New Left historians of the late 1960s and 1970s for their "easy dismissal 
oftheory."108 Dower, in an essay published a decade later, commented sarcastically that "many 
poststructuralist intellectuals still associate themselves with a nebulous 'Left.",I09 Though both 
Harootunian and Dower committed "intellectual parricide" by criticizing the approach of their 
mentors, they did not agree on the strategy that should be used to negate its effects. They in 
effect inaugurated what may be seen as a two-pronged Left in the field of Japanese history. 
Contestation over the meaning of the Left and who represents it among American historians 
writing about Japan is a product of this Vietnam War era of the late 1960s and early 1970s. 
Denying Japanese Uniqueness: 
The Theoretical and Comparative Strategies 
of Harry Harootunian and Carol Gluck, 1975-1988 
In Japan, "high economic growth" throughout the 1960s contributed to the emergence of 
nihonjinron, "theories of the Japanese," in the 1970s. These "theories" read like hyper versions 
ofmodernizationist arguments like Bellah's in Tokugawa Religion, which explained Japan's 
108 H. D. Harootunian, review of E. H. Norman: His Life and Scholarship, edited by Roger W. Bowen, 
Journal of Asian Studies 47, no. 4 (November 1988): 879. 
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"successful" industrialization in terms of "the Japanese value system." They conjured an image 
of a unique society composed of a racially homogeneous people who communicated with each 
other instinctively and worked and lived in harmony with one another. Ideologically, nihonjinron 
worked to discourage conflict and criticism within Japan by deflecting attention to a putatively 
shared national cultural endowment. This conservative discourse received reinforcement from 
books like Ezra Vogel's Japan As Number One, which became a bestseller in Japan after it was 
published in 1979.110 President Ronald Reagan meanwhile reinvigorated the waning Cold War 
with talk of the Soviet Union as an "evil empire," with the result that, in American media, "the 
Japanese economic threat" vied with "the Soviet military threat" for the status of the nemesis 
Americans most feared during the 1980s. 
The Vietnam War generations of historians responded to the rise of celebratory 
nationalism during the 1970s and '80s in a way opposite to how the World War II generation 
responded to anti-Communist rhetoric of the 1950s and '60s. Whereas the WWII generation 
received their training from the U.S. government so that they might contribute to a winning a war 
that most thought that America was justifiably fighting in, the Vietnam War generation went 
through graduate school during a time of protest against the government. In keeping with the 
anti-Establishment stance that they had learned and cultivated, they demonstrated a concerted 
effort to break with the modernization approach, which had supported the developmentalist 
narrative that prioritized rising levels of per capita income. 
The least radical example of history that departed from the linear narrative of Japan's 
successful modernization came in social history. Without challenging the metanarrative of 
modernization, Mikiso Hane showed its "underside." In Peasants, Rebels, and Outcasts, 
110 There are many critical studies of nihonjinron in English-language scholarship. For this paragraph, I 
looked at H. D. Harootunian, "America's Japan / Japan's Japan," in Japan in the World, ed. Masao Miyoshi and H. 
D. Harootunian (Durham: Duke University Press): 196-221; J. Victor Koschmann, "Intellectuals and Politics," in 
Postwar Japan as History, ed. Andrew Gordon (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1993): 
403-423; Tessa Morris-Suzuki, Re-Inventing Japan: Time, Space, Nation (Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 
1998), 127-130; and Dower, "Sizing Up," 8-15. 
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published in 1982, Hane asked how modernization "affect [ ed] the lives of the people who carried 
its burden and paid its costS?,,1l1 The result was a necessary corrective to often fatuous paeans to 
the Japanese "miracle," which Norman was fighting already in the late 1930s and which 
resurfaced in connection with the economic booms of the 1960s. 
Other historians tried to attack the foundations of the modernization approach by 
experimenting with ways of writing history that eschewed assumptions about the linear sequence 
of past events that flow from one to the other in a continuous stream of cause and effect. Aside 
from the political contestations of the Vietnam War period, which sensitized Americans to 
conflict, pluralism, and rupture, theoretical scholarship--much of it written in continental Europe 
amid sweeping changes in everyday life in the aftermath ofWWllI12--influenced decisions to take 
a synchronic, rather than diachronic, approach and to focus on discontinuity, rather than 
continuity. In his introduction to Conflict in Modern Japanese History, Tetsuo Najita explained 
that, in workshops that led to the publication of the edited volume, contributors arrived at the 
view "that conflicts in modem Japan did not occur as one confrontation after another in a linear 
series." They occurred, rather, in the context of "discontinuous systems of historical action," one 
of which could be said to have been in operation from 1850 to 1880 and another of which 
functioned between 1900 and 1930. Each of these "conflictual 'systems'" contained its own 
comparable "coherent set of internal identities."113 As one might infer from the argument and 
from the footnotes citing Claude Levi-Strauss, Najita and his colleagues found much that 
appealed to them in structuralist theory, which held that meaning arises from the relations of 
signs in a closed signifying system. 
From the time ofthe conference at Hakone, scholars had noted that the modernization 
111 Mikiso Hane, Peasants, Rebels, and Outcastes: The Underside of Modern Japan (New York: Pantheon 
Books), xi. 
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approach minimized attention to ideas. What attention there was tended to focus on "attitudes," 
"values," or "motivations" that contributed to explanations for why people acted (or did not act) 
in pursuit of political or economic goals. 1I4 In 1971, John Hall indicated that he thought a change 
was taking place. He made a link between "premises which begin with a skepticism about the 
direction which modem society is taking and look for alternatives to accepted developmental 
norms" and "fascination with problems of finding meaning in a changing world and of generating 
the motivations to absorb change."1l5 Intellectual history, he suggested, was the next big thing: 
Intellectual history, not viewed simply as the chronology of the transmission of 
ideas, but as inquiry into the real intellectual struggles of Japanese, ofleft or right, 
in working out their personal and national identities under pressure of modem 
change, this is the subject that seems to hold out the most prospect of relevance 
for a growing segment of the present generation of scholars. 116 
As representatives of the "growing segment of the present generation," Hall mentioned Robert 
Lifton, Irwin Scheiner, and Harry Harootunian. 
Over the next couple of decades, intellectual history did indeed turn out to be a vibrant 
field, but Hall's prediction about the kind of intellectual history that would interest scholars 
proved to be less prescient. The intellectual history taught and practiced at the University of 
Chicago by Harootunian and Najita, in particular, did not concentrate on struggles to work out 
personal and national identities and in fact eschewed a biographical approach. These historians 
cared not about "finding meaning in a changing world," but about producing meaning, and not 
about "generating the motivations to absorb change," but about forming subjectivities capable of 
bringing about change. 
114 Bellah, Tokugawa Religion (1957); Yoshio Sakata and John Whitney Hall, "The Motivation of 
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Hall, in fact, missed the point of Harootunian's 1970 book Toward Restoration when he 
suggested that it was primarily about a struggle to work out identities. As the subtitle indicates, 
the book was about "the growth of political consciousness." In a twist on Maruyama Masao's 
study of the development of modem consciousness from Chu Hsi (neo )Confucianism through the 
thought of Ogyft Sorai to kokugaku, Harootunian traced the development of a revolutionary 
political consciousness from the sonno joi (revere the emperor, repel the barbarian) theory of the 
Mito school through the vision of a new political space articulated by Sakuma Shozan, Yoshida 
Shoin, and Maki Izumi to the practical sectionalism of Y okoi Shonan, Takasugi Shinsaku, Kido 
Koin, and Okubo Toshimichi, which made the Meiji Restoration thinkable, and hence, doable. 117 
Twenty years later, in a new preface to the paperback edition, he noted that Toward Restoration 
"was not driven by theory" and that, since its publication, "theory and cultural studies 
underwent a revolution."118 
This "revolution" included not only structuralism, but also the more radical 
poststructuralist conception of "an endless chain of signifiers in which meaning is always 
deferred and finally absent": "Unbound, ungrounded, relieved of their referential burdens, words 
became protean and uncontrollable." II 9 This understanding oflanguage opened the way for a new 
approach to texts--now viewed as productive of "multiple readings and divergent meanings," 
rather than as closed systems susceptible to a limited number of interpretations. 120 For 
historians, poststructuralist theories meant that "documents" (renamed "texts") could produce 
different meanings depending upon what they were read together with and that the meanings of 
their own histories were not stable either. With Paul Ricouer's idea that action, too, can be read 
11 7 H. D. Harootunian, Toward Restoration: The Growth of Political Consciousness in Tokugawa Japan 
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of Cali fomi a Press, 1970). 
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as a text, the possibilities for signification expanded even further. 121 
To different degrees and in different amounts, Harootunian, Najita, and their students 
Herman Ooms and J. Victor Koschmann combined structuralist and poststructuralist theories of 
the production of meaning with the theories of Michel Foucault and the Marxists Louis 
Althusser and Antonio Gramsci about power, discourse, and ideology to write histories of the 
Tokugawa period that pursued questions of the relationship between thought and action. 
Probably in connection with their experiences during the Vietnam War era, the books these 
historians published during the 1980s reveal a particular concern for the political. Najita in 
writing about merchant "visions of virtue" and Harootunian in writing about kokugaku each 
considered how non-political discourses can come to authorize political action.122 Koschmann 
attempted "to consider how thought, as ideology, enabled people to act under the historical 
circumstances that confronted them and, furthermore, to act in ways that sometimes undermined 
rather than supported the existing order.,,'23 The problem of "motivation" here was reconfigured 
as a question of subjectivity. Koschmann quoted from Goren Therbom's work The Ideology of 
Power and the Power of Ideology (1980): "Ideologies not only subject people to a given order. 
They also qualify them for conscious social action, including actions of gradual or revolutionary 
change." 124 
Ooms' Tokugawa Ideology had more in common with Carol Gluck's Japan's Modern 
Myths, although a connection between the two seems not to have been made at the time, despite 
121 J. Victor Koschmann cited Ricoeur's Interpretation Theory (Fort Worth: Texas Christian University 
Press, 1976), and "The Model of the Text," Social Research 38, no. 3 (Autumn 1971) to introduce the idea of 
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their shared publisher and year of publication, Princeton University Press in 1985.125 Ooms, who 
referred his readers to his essay ''Neo-Confucianism and the Formation of Early Tokugawa 
Ideology: Contours of a Problem" for methodological discussion,126 there wrote that because "[i]n 
general, the invocation of existing ideologies does not occur in toto but rather is a partial and 
piecemeal matter," one could assume with reasonable assurance that "ideologies never take shape 
all at once": "Their establishment," in other words, "is not an event but a process."127 Gluck 
similarly took a constructivist approach, arguing that "[i]deologies of the sort imperial Japan 
produced were neither created ex nihilo nor adopted ready-made" and that her subject would be 
the "fitful and inconsistent process" that constituted "the making oflate Meiji ideology."128 For 
Ooms and for Gluck, contemporary theories of language, meaning, and power provided ways to 
write histories of Tokugawa and Meiji ideologies that challenged the interpretations of their 
Japanese colleagues. Neither Neo-Confucianism nor tennosei (the emperor system) would ever 
seem as monolithic again. 
In the early 1980s, Dominick LaCapra, a historian of European intellectual history, noted 
that "[t]he field of humanistic studies today seems increasingly divided into two opposed 
tendencies." On the one hand, there were those scholars who "more or less self-consciously" 
attempted "to rehabilitate conventional approaches to description, interpretation, and 
explanation" out of a "need to discover or perhaps to invent ... unity and order in the 
phenomena under investigation and, by implication, in [their] own life and times." On the other 
hand, there were those who exhibited a more "experimental" tendency in their work, evidence of 
an effort to expose the common assumptions upon which the conventional view rested. As a 
125 Rennan Ooms, Tokugawa Ideology: Early Constructs, 1570-1680 (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1985). Carol Gluck, Japan's Modern Myths: Ideology in the Late Meiji Period (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1985). 
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strategy, they therefore "stress [ ed] the importance of what is marginal in text or life as seen from 
the conventional view--what is uncanny or disorienting in terms of its assumptions."129 
In the field of Japanese history, there was indeed a noticeable division between 
conventional versus experimental tendencies, which can be observed at its widest in the exchange 
between Harootunian and Harold Bolitho published in Monumenta Nipponica in 1980. In the 
Spring issue, Bolitho published a review of Japanese Thought in the Tokugawa Period, 1600-
1868: Methods and Metaphors, edited by Najita and Irwin Scheiner, in which he suggested that 
the volume contained "papers of two kinds--those which address themselves to fairly modest 
issues, and those which try to do more."130 Harootunian's paper, titled "The Consciousness of 
Archaic Form in the New Realism ofKokugaku," counted as one of those "which try to do more" 
and which, in attempting too much, "fail."l3l Bolitho made clear that he did not appreciate 
authors raising questions that they do not answer; invocations of "names from a shared 
intellectual pantheon" for what seemed to him to be "some ritualistic purpose"; and writing in a 
style which (in his opinion), "dense at the best of times, occasionally slops over into 
unintelligibility."132 "[T]he duty of intellectual historians," in his view, "is to tell us--without 
inflated rhetoric, without willful obscurity, and without slovenly English" "what the people of 
the past thought (or rather, ... what they wrote)."I33 Two issues later, in Autumn, Harootunian 
responded with a critique of Bolitho's review, pointing out that "Bolitho never discloses the 
reasons governing his preference" for the "more successful" papers.134 He suggested that Bolitho 
could not understand his vocabulary "because he probably [did]n't know the writers and thinkers 
from which it is derived" and argued that "to demand that we write clearly and lucidly is to ask 
129 Dominick LaCapra, Rethinking Intellectual History: Texts, Contexts, Language (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press), 68. 
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us to write the kind of history that he--Bolitho--believes is normative for all times and places."135 
Because Bolitho was not willing to entertain "the importance of the methodological and 
theoretical concerns [he] tried to articulate," he wrote a review that did not engage the substance 
of Harootunian's arguments. 136 Bolitho's rejoinder, published in the same Autumn issue, in tum 
criticized Harootunian for failing to respond to points raised about "his failure to 
communicate."137 In his opinion, Harootunian had devoted himself ''to making chaos out of 
chaos" in an extreme effort to avoid "impos[ing] artificial order" on anything and so "[could] not 
complain if few follow.'ms 
For someone reading this exchange twenty years later, it is difficult not to be more 
sympathetic to Harootunian's position. "Communication" cannot be as black-and-white a matter 
as Bolitho imagined it to be if I can often understand Harootunian's expressions--"entrapment" 
and "interiority" among them 139 --better than I can grasp the meaning of some of Bolitho's 
phrases, which in two instances assume knowledge of Latin 140 and French141 (he offers no 
translation) and in one instance leaves me at a complete loss: "hoist with his own petard."142 The 
point here is that there does indeed seem to be a politics to language--a point that Harootunian 
was (and is) well aware of and Bolitho either was not or was not willing to admit, which either 
way speaks to his conservatism. For a more meaningful criticism of Harootunian's experimental 
tendency, we need to tum to the writings of someone like LaCapra, who moved in the same 
m Harootunian, "Correspondence," 370-1. 
136 Harootunian, "Correspondence, 372. 
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theoretical circles as Harootunian. The "danger" of the experimental tendency, he wrote, 
is that it will remain fixated at the phase of simple reversal of dominant 
conventional assumptions and replace unity with disunity, order with chaos, 
center with absence of center, determinacy with uncontrolled plurality or 
dissemination of meaning, and so forth. In doing so, it may aggravate what its 
proponents would see as undesirable tendencies in the larger society, become 
symptomatic where it would like to be critical, and confuse ordinary equivocation 
and evasiveness--or even slipshod research--with the kind of transformative 
interaction between self and other (or language and world) it would like to 
reactivate. 143 
To determine whether or not Harootunian's essay, or subsequent work which has also been 
harshly criticized by some,l44 succumbed to this danger requires a much more careful reading than 
Bolitho was willing to give it. 145 
Bolitho, of course, was not the only reviewer of Japanese Thought. Carol Gluck's 
review, published in the Journal of Asian Studies, sympathized with what Bolitho criticized. She 
acknowledged that "liminality in the Tokugawa village, neo-Confucian synecdoche, semiotics and 
the verbalizer suru" made for a disorienting reading experience, but, she continued, "[h laving 
ventured successfully through, ... one finds one's attitude changed." The essays ofthe second 
half of the volume, which Bolitho preferred, seemed to Gluck "unexpectedly lame" in contrast to 
methodologically and theoretically innovative essays of the first half.146 One might wonder, 
143 LaCapra, 68-9. 
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though, if Gluck was being too understanding. If one truly "moves from one universe of 
discourse to another" in the course of moving from part one to part two of the book, what are the 
implications? How did her attitude change as a result of reading the fIrst part? By taking Najita 
and Harootunian in and restating their arguments in "plain" English, she seems to have diffused 
their radical intent without warning her readers. She did not defend her slightly-Ieft-of-center 
position any more than Bolitho explained his reasons for being to the right. 
Gluck did not openly defIne or defend her position, either, in Japan's Modern Myths, 
where one might expect her to have done so. The problem with this approach becomes evident 
when one reads the book reviews. Atsuko Hirai, in a famously long and negative review, 147 
criticized Gluck for assimilating the Meiji emperor to a constitutional monarch and for translating 
kokka as "nation" (instead of as "state") and kokumin as "citizens" (instead of as "the nation," 
"the people," or "the populace"). "[E]specially because she works cross-culturally, translating 
as well as interpreting sources," Gluck should, Hirai thought, show "greater fIdelity to the basic 
and well-established meanings ofwords.,,148 Whether or not "the basic and well-established 
meanings of words" are appropriate when one does not agree with the basic and well-established 
histories is not a point that Hirai can entertain because she does not like Gluck's history: 
"Where Marx and Engels once were worshipped, Gluck erects a shrine to Clifford Geertz, Louis 
Althusser, and Antonio Gramsci. The exchange of gods helps Gluck exonerate the Meiji 
Emperor, the Meiji imperial system, and its architects."149 Hirai did not like Gluck's history, of 
course, because ofthis last political issue. By controlling Gluck's language, Hirai expected 
(whether she realized it or not) that she would be able to steer her back in the direction of a 
political position more critical of the Meiji state. But this is not where Gluck wanted to go 
because she was trying to combat the view that Japanese were unique in the way they went 
147 Atsuko Hirai, "The State and Ideology in Meiji Japan--A Review Article," Journal of Asian Studies 46, 
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about their nation-making process. In one especially clear expression of her anti-uniqueness 
position, she insisted "once again" that "Japan was in its process of ideological formation a good 
deal less than unique, and should be seen in the larger context of late nineteenth- and early 
twentieth-century developments in the newly contemporary world of Barraclough's 
description." She also "stress[ed] that the process of converting the Japanese into kokumin was 
as complicated and drawn out as turning peasants into Frenchmen, Germans into a Germanic 
Volk, or immigrants into one-hundred-percent Americans."150 In the context ofthe celebrations of 
Japanese uniqueness aired in speeches and nihonjinron literature during the 1970s and '80s, her 
historical argument carried a political message. She saved her references to this context until the 
very end of her Epilogue, however, where she observed: 
The sense of nation, of being Japanese, was transmitted to the whole of the 
kokumin for the first time in the Meiji period and is not much diminished today. 
Nor is the postwar pride in the national achievements and international status of 
'our country, Japan' (wagaguni), although the status of joining the ranks of the 
imperialist powers has been replaced with that of gaining preeminence among the 
economic and cultural ones. 151 
Had Gluck been more open about her concerns regarding cultural nationalism from the outset, and 
acknowledged her political choice to emphasize commonalities in response to contemporary 
political circumstances, Hirai would have had to (or should have felt obligated to) demonstrate a 
similar level of political awareness in her review. As it happened, despite the little common 
ground shared between Hirai and Gluck, both wrote as if their arguments represented faithful, if 
not objective, renditions of the past, largely unaffected by contemporary political circumstances 
and undetermined by their individual political choices. This is a typical example of what Freud 
150 Gluck, Japan's Modern Myths, 39. 
lSI Gluck, Japan's Modern Myths, 286. 
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called "transference," noticeable also in the debates surrounding E. H. Nonnan,152 in which 
different political views in the present are "transferred" and played out in tenns of struggles over 
interpretations of the past. 
In contemplating Gluck's anti-uniqueness stance, one is made to realize how close her 
work is in spirit to Nonnan's (Japan's emergence is no miracle) and to Hall's (fmding the 
appropriate comparative frame). Like Nonnan and Hall, in other words, she wanted Japan to be 
in "world" history. The main difference between Gluck and Nonnan or Hall was that, for 
disciplinary reasons, for writing good history as she conceived it, Gluck tried to see Meiji on its 
own tenns, apart from what happened in the 1930s. Here she showed herself to be a historian of 
her generation, taking a relatively short slice oftime--the late 1880s to 1915, about the same 
length of time as was considered in the two "discontinuous systems of historical action" 
discussed in the Conflict volume--and observing how all the different elements of the period 
interacted. She addressed change over time, of course, as the contributors to the Conflict volume 
ended up doing, too, but she did so while minimizing the effect of knowing where it all ends up. 
Harootunian was also committed to an anti-uniqueness position. Like Gluck, he reserved 
discussion of the contemporary context for an Epilogue--in this case, the epilogue of Things Seen 
and Unseen--but his comments were more explicit. The "mushrooming of books, articles, and 
mass media perfonnances" that "raised the question of Japan's unique cultural endowment and 
rehearsed its various scenarios" began in the 1950s, he explained, "in a context in which hopes for 
a genuine political democracy began to dim and massive economic expansion began to take off." 
Nihonjinron "sought to turn people away from the disappointments of postwar democratic 
theory and practice to the blandishments of higher standards of living and consumption. ,,153 
Obviously no friend to these theories of Japanese uniqueness, Harootunian joined Gluck in 
152 Harootunian explictly mentioned Freud and "transference" in his 1988 review of the volume on Norman 
edited by Roger Bowen. Interestingly, and typically, Harootunian did not include himself as an example of one 
who has used interpretations ofNonnan's work to make a political point. 
153 Harootunian, Things Seen and Unseen, 437. 
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resisting their exclusionist claims. But at least in the histories he published during the 1980s, his 
strategy did not involve comparisons of national histories. He made his point, rather, by 
insisting that theories developed outside Japan could be used to discuss Japanese history. He 
could do this without suffering from Hall's anxieties about the application of the term 
"feudalism" to Japan, because he thought of the theories as reading strategies, and not as labels 
for realities in the past that could be objectively analyzed. His approach was more flexible than 
Gluck's because it did not depend upon actual historical similarities. It should come as no 
surprise that Gluck has devoted her entire career to Japan's modem period, when 
"commonalities" often derive from real connections and shared conditions. 
The difference between Harootunian and Gluck, as I see it, is that Harootunian has, over 
time, come to commit himself to the role of an avant garde intellectual. Certainly by the 1990s, 
he seems to have been convinced by the Frankfurt School position that the culture industry of 
capitalist societies renders effective criticism of prevailing ideologies an extremely demanding 
task. He brings his disciplinary skills as a historian to this task, but his primary identity is that 
of an avant garde intellectual. Gluck, on the other hand, seems to be committed primarily to the 
practice of "good" history. Attempting to historicize her times and herself and speaking out as a 
historian about uses of the past seem to be her primary concerns. She is less interested in 
adopting the role of the critic than she is in being a critical progressive, sharply realistic yet 
optimistic about the future. 
Harootunian and Gluck shared an antipathy for the modernization approach and for 
nihonjinron celebrations of national community, but their strategies for resisting the claims of 
these theories differed. In part, this was because they were starting from different diagnoses of 
the problems. For Harootunian, the hostility toward ideas that he detected in the modernization 
approach required redress. He made inquiry into the relationship between thought and action a 
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priority, and he did so by drawing heavily from contemporary structuralist, poststructuralist, 
and formalist theory developed in continental Europe and the United States. By emphasizing the 
importance of these theories, he was able to fight against arguments that Japanese history was so 
unique that only indigenous concepts would do. He was also able to make Japanese history into 
a field to be taken seriously by scholars who did not specialize in the study of a Japanese past, 
but could relate to the theories he used to talk about it. Gluck also drew upon some of the same 
theoretical scholarship, but for her, two other strategies were paramount. The first, directed even 
more at Japanese scholarship than at the modernization approach, involved emphasizing that 
ideologies of the Meiji period were not a consequence of smooth transitions orchestrated by a 
prescient elite bent upon oppressive control of the minds of the people, but rather the 
consequence of a trial-and-error process that reflected competing interests and partial successes. 
The second consisted of her strategy of comparison. She was one of those historians mentioned 
in her own historiographical essay "who had trained themselves to think of Japan as an instance 
of historical modernity commensurate with other such instances, from Korea to France."l54 Here 
she was going against Norman's argument that modernity in Japan was less complete than it was 
in England or in France and against the modernizationist perspective that Japan was a successful 
late modernizer and therefore a good model for the rest of the non-Western developing world. In 
retrospect, Japan's Modern Myths stands out historiographically as the book that resuscitated 
for the field of Japanese history the category of modernity as one useful to those interested in 
cutting across Japanese, American, and all other national exceptionalisms. 
154 Gluck, "House of Mirrors," 444. 
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Conclusion: The 1990s and Beyond 
The Tiananmen Square massacre of 1989 reminded people around the world that liberal 
economic refonn did not necessarily mean the toppling of Communist leadership. Still, by 1991, 
when the Warsaw Pact officially disbanded and the Soviet Union officially ceased to exist, the 
Cold War was over. President George Bush, Sr., suggested in 1990 that a "new world order" 
would emerge, which would constitute "a community of nations bound by a common 
commitment to peace and restraint."155 But President Bill Clinton's often-criticized ad hoc foreign 
policy implied that finding one's way in the post-Cold War world was not so easy. Should the 
United States as "the world's only superpower" be "the world's policeman" was a major question 
of the decade. Ethnic nationalism--with the conflict among Serbs, Croatians, and Muslims in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina providing the prime example--and "globalization" --associated with 
transnational corporations, such as Nike, and communication networks, like the Cable News 
Network (CNN) and the Intemet--seemed to be the two features of the post-Cold War world 
that most often grabbed people's attention. 
The "lack of surety in the present world," wrote Carol Gluck in the mid-1990s, "brings a 
(relative) absence of orthodoxy" in the writing of history. 156 John Dower in effect agreed, 
asserting that "[ n]o one ... can any longer point to a dominant paradigm governing Western 
perceptions of Japan."157 Amidst diversity and innovation in approaches in the absence of a 
dominant paradigm, political circumstances and political choices continued to infonn uses and 
disuses of "modernity." 
The most exciting fonnulation of "modernity" in history-writing of the 1990s appeared in 
Harry Harootunian's masterful study Overcome by Modernity: History, Culture, and Community 
ISS George Bush, "Why We Are in the Gulf," Newsweek (November 26, 1990): 28. 
156 Gluck, "House of Mirrors," 451. 
157 Dower, "Sizing Up," 32. 
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in Interwar Japan. He wrote of "co-eval modernity," an expression intended to capture the 
"contemporaneity" of negotiations taking place around the world "between the local and received 
cultural habits--the culture ofreference--and the requirements of the new global processes of 
capitalist expansion. ,,158 Unevenness, in his view, is part of capitalism, and the idea that any 
country would ever be completely modem is an unrealizable aspiration. Perhaps symptomatic of 
an intensified sense of simultaneity engendered by air travel, satellite television, and the Internet, 
Harootunian's formulation offers hope for an escape from assumptions that "true time was kept 
by the modem West.,,159 (Undergraduate students in a Columbia University seminar called this 
"moving the finish line": As soon as other nations appeared to be "catching up," the always 
already modernized West would move the line further ahead--become "postmodern" at the 
moment other nations were becoming "modem," for example.) In this way, "co-eval modernity" 
fits with a politics declared in the statement of purpose found in the inside cover of every issue 
of positions: east asia cultures critique, a journal first published in 1993: "In seeking to explore 
how theoretical practices are linked across national and ethnic divides, we hope to construct other 
positions from which to imagine political affinities across the many dimensions of our 
differences." Harootunian facilitated this imagination of affinities by placing Japanese and non-
Japanese writers and texts of the 1920s and '30s "into direct relationship with each other" based 
upon their shared concern for "modernity."I60 
Also for political reasons, Gregory Pflugfelder chose not use the category of "modernity" 
in his book Cartographies of Desire: Male-Male Sexuality in Japanese Discourse, 1600-1950. 
Published in 1999, the book can be read as a study of the modernization of the discourse on 
sexuality in Japan, although to read it this way would be to read it against the argument as it is 
carefully presented. The conspicuous absence of reference to modernity in the book is a clue to 
158 Harootunian, Overcome, xvi-xvii. 
159 Harootunian, Overcome, xv-xvi. 
160 Harootunian, Overcome, xxxi. 
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Plfugfelder's (political) point that discourses on sexuality do not move forward or backward, but 
rather they change--and they can change again. 161 
Over the course of the period discussed in this paper, 1940-2000, uses and disuses ofthe 
category of modernity fluctuated in relation to political circumstances and political choices made 
by historians. The most significant fluctuation, which perhaps amounts to a reorientation, 
occurred in the late 1960s and 1970s when many intellectuals--in France, in Japan, in the United 
States, and elsewhere--modified, or even retired, optimistic hopes for socialist or liberal 
democracy and economic abundance, more or less equally distributed, for all. With the allure of 
the modem much diminished, historians began writing of quality rather than of process, of 
modernity rather than of modernization. At the end of the twentieth century, historians were 
still sorting out the meaning of this reorientation. Even more striking than this relative 
discontinuity, however, is the resilience of the category put into operation in English-language 
history-writing about Japan by E. H. Norman. At this point, I can only join other historians in 
hypothesizing that the world that came into being with technologies of long-distance travel and 
communication, capitalist expansion, the construction of nation-states, imperialist conquest and 
settlement, and mass social formations remained relevant over the course of this sixty-year 
period. In conjunction with the completion of this paper, I enter upon the stage in my graduate 
studies when I begin making political choices in reference to the political circumstances of my 
time, the first decade of the twenty-first century. The ways in which I choose to use, or not to 
use, the category of modernity will illuminate my political intent. 
161 Gregory M. Pflugfelder, Cartographies of Desire: Male-Male Sexuality in Japanese Discourse, 1600-
1950 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of Cali fomi a Press, 1999). 
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